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Abstract 
Since its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, Vietnam has been under pressure to 
reduce the size of the state-owned sector. In this process, the private sector has emerged. The objective of this 
paper is to examine how the privatization could contribute better to economic growth and hence further 
accelerate poverty reduction in Vietnam. We use the multi-sectorial integrated activity analysis model, and 
apply it to the data of the Vietnamese economy in 2007 to measure the impacts of ownership restructuring on 
economic growth. If labour and capital could reallocate across sectors and type of ownership, what would be 
the optimal allocation of activities and the feasible level of domestic final demand? Factor inputs are capital and 
four types of labour, namely technicians, high skilled, low skilled and unskilled workers. The model keeps track 
on asymmetric mobility of labour endowments by skill levels. 
Main contributions of this paper are fourfold. First, we demonstrate that that at the optimum, privatization does 
not mean to weaken the economic power of state sector. Second, we propose a specific pattern of SOE reform 
for Vietnam. Third, alternative experiments on the mobility of labour to shows that there is a trade-off between 
further privatization toward economic efficiency gain and job-creation in Vietnam, which means privatization 
does not contribute to job creation. Last, the paper shows that current skill situation of Vietnam’s labour force 
will be a ‘bottle neck’ for Vietnam economic growth in the near future. 
 
JEL classification: C61, O47, P31 
Keywords: Vietnamese economy, transition economy, privatization, economic growth, poverty reduction, 
general equilibrium. 
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1 Introduction 
Since 1986 Vietnam has made the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. 
One of the most striking features of Vietnam’s transition has been the steady growth of 
output (see figure (1)) and remarkable achievement of poverty reduction without widening 
inequality (Klump, 2007).  
FIGURE 1. Economic Growth in Vietnam, 1985-2009 
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Source: Tran Van Tho et al. (2000) for data to 1990, post 1990 data from General Statistic Office 
(GSO) (2008, 2009) 
Vietnam’s rapid economic growth is marked by the state owned enterprise reform (SOE 
reform) and the emergence of viable private sector, which has been facilitated by a new legal 
framework for private enterprises.  
When Vietnam was a centrally planned economy, government and state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) (including co-operatives) were the only two sectors. All economic activities were 
planned and controlled by the government. The labour and capital markets were no 
exception. Based on the overall plan laid down by the government, the number of workers as 
well as the capital stocks allocated for each organization were determined by their respective 
administrative units. A salary budget was allocated and workers were paid according to a 
predetermined scale. 
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The inefficiency of the central planned system resulted in the collapse of many SOEs, 
forcing the government to embark on an economic reform, often known as “Doi Moi” 
(Renovation). The economic reform, unveiled in 1986, represented a significant step towards 
a market-oriented economy. One important feature during the reform was the gradual demise 
of SOEs and the gradual expansion of private firms. The number of SOEs dropped from 
some 12,000 to 6,020 by the end of 1996 (of which 1,140 enterprises belonging to state 
corporations, 500 centrally-controlled state enterprises, and 4,380 locally-controlled state 
enterprises) (Webster and Amin, 1998). More than 10 years later, the total number of SOEs 
was roughly 2,176 in 2007 (CIEM, 2007).  
The SOE reform and the emergence of the private sectors significantly affected the quantity 
and quality of job creation in Vietnam (Klump, 2007). Along with the falling number of 
SOEs, the level of employment in SOEs has decreased dramatically since the launch of “Doi 
Moi” (O’Conner, 1996). Between 1986 and the mid-1990s, total state sector employment 
dropped by over a quarter (Liu, 2004). By the end of 1996, Vietnamese state enterprises 
employed about two million people (Webster and Amin, 1998). In terms of the share in 
labour market, state sector employment in 1986 accounted for about 15% of total 
employment. During 1991 to 1999, employment share of SOEs dropped form 6.5% to 4.8% 
(Vo, 2000). In contrast, employment in the (formal) private sector more than doubled 
between 1996 and 2000 (World Bank, 2001) and the number of jobs created by the private 
sector was three times higher than those created by SOEs (Liu, 2004). 
The SOE reform first gave the enterprises more autonomy and flexibility in their decision 
making. The real privatization of SOEs started in 1992. This was to be accomplished through 
sales of enterprise shares to employees on preferential terms, to domestic private and public 
investors, and to foreign investors on a limited basis. The opening of Ho-Chi-Minh City 
Securities Trading Center (HoSTC) in 2000 (was upgraded to Ho-Chi-Minh City Stock 
Exchange (HOSE) in 2007) and Hanoi Securities Trading Center (HASTC) in 2005 enabled 
shares of SOEs to be traded in the secondary market on listed bourses. So far, there are 249 
share and fund certificate items listed on the Ho-Chi-Minh City Stock Exchange and Hanoi 
Stock Exchange (138 on HOSE and 111 on HASTC) (Vietnamese Economic Time, 2007). In 
2007, the stock market value equaled 40% of GDP, far exceeding the 25-30% level set by the 
Prime Minister. It is expected that the market capitalization value in 2008 would be as much 
as 50-60% of GDP (Vietnam Economic Time, 2008). The Vietnamese government indicated 
its commitment to speed up the pace of privatization in order to meet the increasing demand 
of the stock market. Currently, the number of listed companies just accounts for 2% of total 
joint stock companies now operational in Vietnam (Vietnam Economic Time, 2008). 
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However, the SOEs reform did not mean to weaken their economic power. That the share of 
state sector in GDP was firmly increasing during the period of privatization (see Figure (2)) 
reflects ‘Hanoi’s consensus’ on the ‘dominating role of state sector’ as a fundamental 
characteristic of the ‘socialism-oriented market economy’ (Ngoc et al., 2006). Figure (2) 
shows that since 1990, the state sector’s share in GDP had kept increasing until 1995 and 
standing constant for a quite long period of time. This discloses a fact that SOE restructuring 
programs only aims at strengthening the state sector. Especially, the year 1996 observed a 
series of conservative policies (Womack, 1997). In June 1996, the Eighth Party Congress 
reemphasized the “leading role” of the state sector as a strategic task.1 The state investment 
hence accelerated with a pace more rapid than any other period (see Figure (3)).  
FIGURE 2. Structure of GDP at current price by ownership, 1990-2008 
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Source: 1990-94 data (GSO, 1996) and post-1994 data (GSO, 2008). 
In summary, Vietnam has achieved an impressive record of GDP growth in the transition 
period. Accompanying this growth is some degree of ownership restructuring. This 
compositional change results from the decline of the number of SOEs, the emergence of the 
private sectors, and the movement of employment to the private sector, resulted via both 
                                                 
1
 In the draft of Political Report, it was suggested to increase the state sector’s share in GDP from current 40% 
to 60%, but then softened to a “leading role” (Womack 1997) 
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absorbing retrenched SOE workers and new job creation of this sector. This has prompted 
questions about whether or not as the case of other countries, ownership restructuring fuelled 
by privatization is an important source of growth. Another view would be that privatization 
is an important and main driver of poverty reduction. This view receives some support from 
Klump (2007). In his study on pro-poor growth in Vietnam, he argues that “new legal 
framework for private enterprises, which facilitated the emergence of private sectors and the 
movement of employment from informal to formal sector industry and services … 
significantly affected the quality and quantity of job creation in Vietnam” and hence “income 
growth and poverty reduction occurred in both urban and rural area” (Klump, 2007, p.120). 
FIGURE 3. Structure of Investment at current price by ownership, 1990-2008 
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Source: Pham & Le (2003) for 1990-94 data, GSO (2008) for post-1994 data. 
The main objective of this proposed study is: to analyze the impacts of privatization on 
economic growth and to understand under what conditions, privatization would result in 
higher poverty reduction.
2
 In this paper we focus on the optimum distribution of economic 
activity across ownership structure. 
If labour and capital could relocate across sectors and types of ownership, what would be the 
optimal allocation of activities and the feasible level of domestic final demand? And hence, 
as privatization proceeds, what accounts for these differences in terms of job-creation 
households’ expenditure and inequality? The paper also addresses some key economic 
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policies namely privatization policy, foreign investment policy and national strategy for 
technological improvement and poverty reduction.  
2 Background 
Economists have recognized the impacts of ownership structural change caused by 
privatization on economic growth. The impact of privatization on firm-specific productivity 
growth was examined by Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter (1994). They focus on 
the effect of state versus private ownership on the rates of firm economic performance. Their 
model and empirical results show the link between ownership and firm-specific rates of 
productivity growth. They argue that, the shift from completely state-ownership to full 
private ownership can increase the long-run annual rate of TFP growth. However, the result 
shows that in the short-run, this effect is expected to be ambiguous theoretically.  
Megginson and Netter (2001) investigate the process of privatization. After being privatized 
firms raise its productivity, increase its investment and lower its prices. Consequently, the 
performance is improved and as state-owned firms produce only a fraction of GDP, they 
argue that such improvements translate into a gain in aggregate growth. 
Another study  on the impacts of privatization is on the increase of foreign-owned shares in 
domestic firms on economic performance of developing countries by Henry (2003). He 
argues that the developing countries would benefit from opening themselves to investment 
from overseas. As the shares held by foreigners increases, the whole economy growth 
averaged 1.1 percent points higher after liberalization than before. 
Privatization, according to McMillan (2004), is generally beneficial economically, 
particularly for transition economies, but not a sole driven force of improving economic 
performance. McMillan argues that state-owned firms depend on their economic 
environment for improving their performance. He points out that the experience of ‘big 
bang’ reform – such as too fast privatization  – justifies the caution to ‘avoid hubris’ because 
some mistakes create a new problem of state capture and underdeveloped institutions. 
However, Havrylyshyn (2004) offers two caveats, which firmly support  the arguments that 
(i) the benefits of privatization without a proper accompanying climate of open competition 
and the rule of law maybe very small or even negligible; and (ii) privatization has resulted in 
a strong concentration of ownership, “it created unintended consequences of speeding up 
privatization by co-opting insiders and then may have been the most important error of 
reform advocates and certainly one area where humility is called for” (Havrylyshyn, 2004, p. 
40) . 
There is a paucity of studies on impact of SOE reform and/or privatization on poverty 
reduction in Vietnam. Huong et al (2003) calculates the employment elasticity of growth and 
finds that during 1992-1997, the elasticity was highest in agriculture where productivity 
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remained low. She argues that this is because agriculture absorbed jobless rural youth and 
workers retrenched by SOE reform, and hence agriculture growth made its effect on poverty 
reduction, mainly in the South of Vietnam.  
In his study, Klump (2007) argues that privatization in Vietnam, and the emergence of 
private sector significantly affected the quality and quantity of job creation. Job creation 
along with income growth as a consequent of the reform process is a combining factor input 
to shrink poverty. Although showing that there is a increasing trend of job creation in the 
private non-farm sector, Klump is not certain about positive impact of privatization on 
poverty reduction without widening inequality.  
This proposed study aims at making a contribution on literature of privatization and fill in 
the gap by studying on the translating impacts of privatization under various scenarios of 
mobility of labour into poverty reduction and inequality. The study also contribute to the 
literature of general equilibrium by applying new technique, which was first developed by 
ten Raa and Mohnen (2002), and its variant by Ngoc and Mohnen (2004). 
3 Methodology 
3.1 The general equilibrium 
We use a variant of general equilibrium (GE) model which was first developed by ten Raa 
and Mohnen (2001) when they propose a new way to locate the comparative advantages of 
two economies linked by international trade. ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) also apply this kind 
of general equilibrium model to estimate total factor productivity growth and decompose 
TFP in to technical change and term of trade effect (2002). Since then some researches have 
applied this kind of modeling in investigating competitive pressures on China in terms of 
income inequality and migration (ten Raa and Pan, 2005). And recently ten Raa and Sahoo 
(2007) use this general equilibrium model to examine competitive pressure on the Indian 
households. 
The model uses the input-output tables of the Vietnamese economy to measure the impacts 
of ownership restructuring on economic growth. The basic idea is that: if labour and capital 
could be reallocated across sectors and types of ownership, what would be the optimal 
allocation of activities and the feasible level of domestic final demand? The basic idea of the 
efficient allocation of resources can be illustrated graphically in Figure (4) follows.  
According to ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) a basic model for an open economy with two 
commodities works as follows: 
 “ Net output is given by vector y . Trade moves it to the domestic final consumption 
vector, f . (Domestic final demand is consumption plus investment, but not net exports. Note 
that commodity 1 is exported and commodity 2 imported.) Trade is a means to align domestic 
final consumption with the preference. Assuming a Leontief welfare function, the optimum is 
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attained by expanding vector f  in its own direction, up to fc , where c  is the expansion 
vector. In figure 1 this is achieved by three things. Production y  is pushed to the production 
possibility frontier (the curved line), reallocated in favor of output 2, yielding point y *, and 
the pattern of trade is changed (exporting commodity 2 and importing commodity 1). The 
frontier of domestic final consumption, fc , is attained by the elimination of slack and the 
reallocation of resources across sectors. Expansion vector c  is a negative measure for 
efficiency. If  c = 1 , the economy is already at its optimum. If c =1.1 , the economy’s 
potential is 10% more than actual performance.”  (ten Raa and Mohnen, 2002, pp. 114-115) 
FIGURE 4. Movement toward the production possibility frontier and gain optimal net output 
 
In this study we set up a GE model for both an open and a closed economy, with fixed 
domestic endowments, and tradeable and non-tradeable commodities (only with open 
economy mode). We assume the Leontief functions for the technologies and preferences. 
The efficient allocation of resources is obtained by pushing the economy to its frontier by 
maximizing the level of domestic final demand.  
In our model privatization is an optimal choice of ownership structure. We do not analyze 
the ex post privatization but the ex ante one. The reason for doing this comes from the fact 
that privatization during almost two decades in Vietnam still reflects ‘Hanoi’s consensus’ on 
the ‘dominating role of state sector’, hence there is no guarantee that the SOE reform has 
been well conducted and its assumed contribution to economic growth and poverty reduction 
are not well analyzed. 
By investigating the optimal choice of privatization and its impacts on poverty reduction we 
assume that future privatization happens under the condition that trade is taken as 
exogenously fixed at actual observed levels for all commodities. Reasons for doing this are 
as follows:  
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(i) Some roles could always be given to international trade as a means to improve 
equality and reduce poverty; hence in an open economy mode poverty is under a 
dual-impact of privatization and international trade. Close economy mode, by its 
nature, helps us to isolate international trade and therefore impact of privatization 
on poverty could be measured in a more accurate way. 
(ii) If we allow free trade and perfectly elastic foreign demand, the economy would 
specialize in production of few commodities for export and import all other 
tradable commodities for domestic demands Since the assumption that Vietnam 
can specialize only on production and export of some particular products is very 
weak, we prefer pursuing the analysis in the context of a closed economy. 
3.2 Factor inputs  
Factor inputs are capital and labour, which are available by 69 sectors in the input-output 
table. Both capital and labour are decomposed into 5 types of ownership namely central-
state-owned, local-state-owned, 100% domestically private-owned, 100% foreign-owned and 
foreign joint-venture.  
Both capital and labour are also modeled as being fully mobilized across sectors and types of 
ownership. Ideally, it is worth to test the model at which capital is modeled as being sector-
specific as in the short-run, capital stocks are sector specific and quite immobile (such as 
machine buildings or lands are not to be assigned easily from one to other industries). 
However, by assuming the non-mobility of capital across sectors, the constraints are 
increased by a number of sectors. Thus when the number of variables stays, an increase in 
number of constraints could then lead to an increase in possibility of co-linearity (matrix 
singular) and/or (under the high rigidity of mobility) an increase in possibility of trivial 
solution. These technical difficulties lead us to the choice of non-capital-specific model. 
There is evidence that poverty measures are sensitive to factor endowments; as poor people 
seem to be less educated, less qualified and less equipped than rich people. Taking this point 
into account, in this scenario, we consider different categories of labour in this mode. For 
each type of ownership, labour is decomposed into four types depending on skill levels 
namely technicians, high skilled, low skilled and unskilled workers. 
Hence, we assume top down hierarchy movement of labour across skill levels. This approach 
follows ten Raa and Pan (2005), and the we define the rule of labour movement as the 
following: (i) technicians can do their own job and also capable of doing high skilled, low 
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skilled and unskilled works; (ii) high skilled workers can do their own job as well as low 
skilled and unskilled works; and (iii) low skilled workers can do their own job as well as 
unskilled works; and (iv) unskilled workers can only perform their own jobs.  
According to ten Raa and Pan (2005), the labour constraints for each type of ownership 
i =1,..,5  could be written as follows: 
(1)    
li
1si £
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å Ni
1
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å
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1 + li
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å si £ Ni
1 + Ni
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where: 
li
1  row vector of technicians’ employment in ownership type i  [# of sector] with respect 
to the labour forces N1
i  
li
2  row vector of high skilled workers’ employment in ownership type i  [# of sector] with 
respect to the labour forces N2
i  
li
3  row vector of  low skilled workers’ employment coefficients in ownership type i  [# of 
sector] with respect to the labour forces N3
i  
li
4  row vector of  unskilled workers’ employment coefficients in ownership type i  [# of 
sector] with respect to the labour forces N3
i  
si  activity vector of ownership type i  [# of sector] with respect to the labour forces N4
i  
In equation (1) the first constrains demand for technicians. The second constrains demand for 
high skilled workers as well as the redundant technicians. The third constrains demand for 
low skilled workers as well as the redundant high skilled workers and technicians. And the 
last constrains demand for not only unskilled workers but also the redundant technicians and 
high skilled and low skilled one for who are not employed at the three top levels. In the 
optimum allocation, the three constraints pick up the shadow prices. The shadow price of 
unskilled workers (the Lagrange multiplier associated with the last constraint) could be used 
as a based wage. The shadow prices of the first, the second and the third constraints are 
technician’s premium and high skill premium and low skill premium. As the technical could 
do any job, hence the wage of a technician will be the sum of based wage and the other three 
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premiums. In case the first constraint is not binding, the technician premium is zero but the 
wage of a technician still be the base wage plus the high skill and low skill premiums. This 
shows that wages will increase by skill.  
3.3 The models 
There are two modes are modeled, namely mode I and mode II. 
Mode I. In Mode I we do not differentiate between types of ownership. This means that the 
dimension of activity level vector  s
1 is [# of sectors].  
The model works as follows. The primal program is: 
(2) 
 
max
s1 ,c1
eT fc1subject to 
 
V T -U( )s1 ³ fc1 + g
L1s1 £ N 1
L1 + L2( )s1 £ N 1 + N 2
L1 + L2 + L3( )s1 £ N 1 + N 2 + N 3
L1 + L2 + L3 + L4( )s1 £ N 1 + N 2 + N 3 + N 4
Ks1 £ M
s1 ³ 0
     
where the endogenous variables ( s
1, c
1) and all other variables and parameters are defined as 
follows [with dimensions in brackets]: 
 s
1 activity vector [# of sectors] 
 c
1 level of domestic final demand [scalar] 
 g  vector of net export [# of tradable commodities] 
 e  unit vector of all components one 
T  transposition symbol 
 f
 domestic final demand [# of commodities] 
 X  vector of gross output 
 V  make table [# of sectors by # of commodities] 
 U  use table [# of commodities by # of sectors] 
 K  capital stock row vector [# of sectors] 
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L1  row vector of technicians’ employment [# of sector] with respect to the labour forces 
N1 [scalar] 
L2  row vector of high skilled workers’ employment [# of sector] with respect to the 
labour forces N 2  [scalar] 
L3 row vector of  low skilled workers’ employment [# of sector] with respect to the labour 
forces N 3 [scalar] 
L4  row vector of  unskilled workers’ employment [# of sector] with respect to the labour 
forces N 4  [scalar] 
 M  capital endowment  [scalar] 
Associated to this primal program is the following dual program: 
(2) 
 
min
p,r ,w³0
rM + wN subject to 
 
 
p V T -U( ) £ rK + wL
pf = eT f
 
The variables in the dual program are the shadow prices 
 p
 of commodities,  r of capital,  w 
of labour, and e  of foreign debt (the exchange rate). Since the commodity constraint in the 
primal program has a zero bound, 
 p
does not show up in the objective function of the dual 
program. 
 p
is normalized by the second dual constraint, essentially about unity. 
Mode II. In Mode II, we apply the 5-type-of-ownership split to all # of sector of the input-
output tables. Now each production sector will be split into five sub-sectors corresponding to 
five types of ownership. Therefore, the dimension of activity level increases to [# of sectors 
times # of ownership types]. The primal program is the variant of the equation (1) as follows: 
(3) 
 
max
s2 ,c2
eT fc2 subject to 
V
split
T -U
split( )s2 ³ fc2 + g =: F
L
1
1 ~ L
2
1 ~ L
3
1 ~ L
4
1 ~ L
5
1( )s2 £ N 1
L
1
1 + L
1
2( ) ~ L21 + L22( ) ~ L31 + L32( ) ~ L41 + L42( ) ~ L51 + L52( )( )s2 £ N 1 + N 2
L
1
1 + L
1
2 + L
1
3( ) ~ L21 + L22 + L23( ) ~ L31 + L32 + L 33( ) ~ L41 + L42 + L43( ) ~ L51 + L52 + L53( )( )s2 £ N 1 + N 2 + N 3
L
1
1 + L
1
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1
3 + L
1
4( ) ~ L21 + L22 + L23 +24( ) ~ L31 + L32 + L 33+L34( ) ~ L41 + L42 + L43 + L44( ) ~ L51 + L52 + L53 + L54( )( )s2 £ N 1 + N 2 + N 3 + N 4
K
1
~ K
2
~ K
3
~ K
4
~ K
5( )s
2 £ M
s2 ³ 0
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where 
 s
2
 activity vector [# of sectors times # of ownership types ] 
 c
2  level of domestic final demand [scalar] 
 
V
split
T  matrix resulted from splitting columns of  V
T  by type of ownership 
 
U
split
 matrix resulted from splitting columns of  U  by type of ownership 
 F  final demand [# of commodities] 
L
i
j  labour employment vector of ownership category i (i = 1, 2,…,5), and with respect to 
skill level j  (j = 1, 2, ..4)  [# of sector] 
 N j  the labour forces with respect to skill level j  (j = 1, 2, ..4)  [scalar]. 
 
K
i
 (i = 1, 2,…,5) capital stock vector  in ownership category i [# of sector] 
 M  Capital endowment [scalar]. 
~ horizontal concatenation operator. 
3.4 Remarks 
1. 
 
U
split
 table and V
split
 table are disaggregated table by types of ownership. The 
 
U
split
 
and V
split
 matrix has the dimension of [# of sectors, # of sectors times # of ownership 
types].  
2. As 
 
U
split
 and V
split
 exist only with respect to the number of industries and types of 
ownership, hence 
 
U
split
 and V
split
 matrices have to be unsplit with respect to different 
levels of skill. Therefore in mode II instead of extending the number of activities 
even further towards different levels of skill, we increase the number of labour 
constraints on labour by level of education/skill, allowing more educated workers to 
work in less education-requiring jobs.  
3. M was computed by multiplying the total observed capital stock by capital utilization 
rate.  
4. N was computed by dividing the total labour employment by labour utilization rate, 
which is available by skill levels.  
4. Data  
The study requires data complied from several sources.  
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The data on sectorial gross output, labour and capital stock by five types of ownership are 
available from The Annual Enterprise Survey conducted by the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam (GSO) (which is available since 2000). The sectorial classification of enterprises is 
at five-digit level of Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification 2007 (VSIC 2007). 
We use the national input-output tables of 2007 published by the GSO of Vietnam, which is 
the latest national benchmark I-O table, compiling based on direct full survey and was 
released in the year 2010. The Vietnam input-output table of 2007 classifies the commodity 
and industry into 138 three-digit level commodities/industries.
2
 However in order to make a 
concordance of the input-output table classification with VSIC 2007 classification we have 
to aggregate the 138 sectors of the 2007 national benchmark I-O table into a 69-sector. 
We use the I-O table, in which V table and U table are disaggregated by types of ownership. 
The new use matrix (
 
U
split
) and make matrix (V
split
) have the dimension of [# of sectors, # of 
sectors times # of ownership types]. 
 
U
split
 and V
split
 contain some missing cells, which 
according to the input-output database are not active ownership sub-sectors in 2007. We are 
obliged to make the assumption that these inactive sub-sectors will not be activated at the 
optimal solution in which the economy operates at the production possibility frontier.  
The data on labour unemployment rate and capacity utilization rate are from the MOLISA 
labour and employment surveys published by the Ministry of Labour Invalids and Socio 
Affairs (MOLISA) of Vietnam (MOLISA, 2009). 
5. Results 
5.1. Impact on economic growth 
TABLE 1. The optimal activity levels of domestic final demand 
Mode I 1.0076 
Mode II 1.2892 
Table (1) contains the activity levels of domestic final demand under mode I and mode II. It 
can be seen from table (1), there is a huge gap of optimal levels of welfare under mode I, 
                                                 
2
 Compilation of SNA-based national I-O tables started in the early 1990s with the compilation of the 1989-
benchmark I-O table. The second and third national I-O table relates to 1996 with 97 production sectors and 
2000 with 112 sectors. Between 1989 and 1996, and 2000 and 2007 annual I-O updating had been also 
undertaken to provide users with more current I-O data. 
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where we don’t consider the sectorial ownership structure (without privatization) and under 
mode II where there are 5 types of ownership across sectors (with privatization). Attainable 
levels of domestic final demand are 0.76 percent under mode I and 28.92 percent under 
mode II. This difference of the achievements can be explained that under mode II, factor 
inputs could be reallocated across 5 types of ownership and across sectors, whereas under 
mode I, factor inputs can only move across sectors. That why, under mode I, the four labour 
constrains are not binding (see appendix table (A.4)), meaning that all four types of labour 
force (technicians, high skilled, low skilled and unskilled workers) are in excess supply. The 
more flexibility there is in reallocation of labour and capital, the closer of the economy 
performance to its production possibility frontier. Under mode II, there are two binding 
labour constrains (see appendix table (A.4)), this means that adding one dimension of labour 
mobility across types of ownership could bring about shortage of supply of technicians and 
high skilled workers. The difference in attainable levels of domestic final demand from two 
modes leads to the conclusion that ownership restructuring (with privatization) does 
contribute to welfare improvement. 
The full activity level of 69 industries is indicated in the appendix table (A.1). In mode II, 
activity levels were aggregated across types of ownership for the sake of comparison with 
mode I. As shown by appendix table (A.1), all sectors gain different attainable levels. We 
could find that some activity levels are huge, that is quite particular to this kind of model, as 
input coefficients are fixed. The attainable levels of petroleum, natural gas are 49.5. The 
explanation for this result is due to the fact that in 2007 Vietnam still relies on almost 100% 
imported petroleum and natural gas. Therefore, in the condition of closed economy (net trade 
is taken as exogenous) all attainable activity levels of other 68 sectors could require a huge 
labour and capital reallocated to petroleum and natural gas for the efforts of domestic 
production, which could take place to replace imports.  
For the breakdown of activity level under mode II by types of ownership, see appendix table 
(A.2). As for mode II, a 28.92 percent increase in domestic final demand from full 
employment of resources, sectorial reallocation of activity and ownership type choice of 
production location. Except when constrained to achieve a solution, no activity gets spread 
over different types of ownership. Symbol ‘-’ denotes non-active sectors that remain non-
active (by construction). We see that activities are generally conducted in local-state-owned 
and joint venture enterprises.  
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Appendix table (A.3) shows the labour productivity by sector and by type of ownership. If 
we compare the two appendices table (A.2) and (A.3), the interesting finding here is even 
though the optimal reallocation of labour is quite consistent with the distribution of the 
highest labour productivity, but not in all sector the movement of labour across sector and 
ownership types is a reflection of the actual labour productivity. 
Appendix table (A.4) shows the factor shadow prices. Capital stock is in short supply in both 
modes, and earns 52.15 percent rate of return under mode I and 34.65 percent return under 
mode II. 
Under mode I, all four labour constrains are not binding or the Lagrange multiplier is zero, 
which means labour is in excess supply. What is interesting here is that under mode II, both 
first two labour constrains are biding. As  technicians and skilled labour are in short of 
supply, technicians gain both technicians’ premium and high skill premium, which is 
104.558 million of Vietnam Dong (VND) per worker per year or 8.7 VND million per month 
(equivalent to 420 USD). The high skill premium is 20.1 VND million, which is 1.68 million 
per month (equivalent to 81 USD). The base wage and low skill premium is zeros due to the 
last two labour constrains are not binding. 
There is a question that how the optimal level of technicians’ and high skill wage reflect the 
real wage rate. Table (2) (follows) shows the real wage rate based on the reports from 
various Department of Labour, Invalids and Socio Affairs (DOLISA) in several provinces 
across Vietnam. If we assume that the base wage and low skill premium at optimal level are 
the same at the observed level. Comparison of optimal and observed level of wage rate is 
shown in table 2. As shown by table (2), except for low skilled and unskilled wages, at the 
optimal level, both wage rates of high skilled and technicians are significantly increased. 
TABLE 2. Wage rate at observed an optimal level (unit: VND million)  
Skill level 
Wage rate (per month) 
Observed Level Optimal Level 
Technicians n.a. 13.993 
High skilled workers  4.000  5.280 
Low skilled workers 2.000  2.000 * 
Unskilled workers  1.600  1.600 * 
Source: author’s calculation based on various labour and wage report of provincial DOLISA at 
Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa, Phu Tho, An Giang provinces of Vietnam. 
Note: * base wage and low skill premium are assumed to be equal to the observed level. 
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TABLE 3. Value added at observed an optimal level (unit: VND million)  
Type of ownership 
Mode II 
Observed Level Optimal Level 
1  157,037,546   199,404,807  
2  102,451,714   340,735,874  
3  488,916,258   81,338,295  
4  195,745,237   229,907,815  
5  150,091,404   643,512,770  
Total  1,094,242,158   1,494,899,562  
TABLE 4. Share of value added at observed an optimal level (unit: %)  
Type of ownership 
Mode II, Scenario 1 
Observed Level Optimal Level 
1 14% 13% 
2 9% 23% 
3 45% 5% 
4 18% 15% 
5 14% 43% 
Total  100%   100%  
1: state-central-owned  2: state-local-owned  3: 100% private-owned  
4: 100% foreign-owned 5: joint-venture 
Table (3) (above) shows the value added produced by SOEs (central and local ones), private 
firms and foreign invested firms (100% foreign owned and joint venture) under mode II. And 
table (4) (above) shows corresponding contribution to total GDP by 5 types of ownership. At 
the optimal allocation, state-central-owned firms produce less value added than at the 
observed level. Whereas the role of state-local-owned firms become more important as their 
value added at optimum increases remarkably. Its contribution to total GDP rise from 9 
percent at observed level to 23 percent at the optimum. Private firms seem loss its 
importance at the optimum as their value added is expected to fall sharply after optimal 
allocation of resources. While playing a main role of contribution to GDP at 45 percent (at 
observed level), private firms’ contribution to total GDP, due to its less efficiency in 
production, become lowest at optimal allocation of resources (5 percent). Surprisingly, 100% 
foreign invested firms produce much less value added than before and hence lower their role 
to the lowest group (drop from 18 to 15 percent). Vietnam economy, at the optimal 
 19 
allocation of resources, relies heavily on join venture firms by  more than 43 percent of GDP 
generation - the role, which played by private firms at the observed level. 
5.2 Impact on job creation 
The Vietnam Development Report 2000 shows that “sustained poverty reduction over the 
coming years must focus on three critical areas: creating opportunity, ensuring equity and 
reducing vulnerability” (World Bank, 1999, p.39). In this proposed study, poverty analysis 
focuses on one of these three critical areas: creating opportunity. Creating Opportunity has a 
number of dimensions. In this paper, we focus our analysis on net job-creation (defined as 
the different between optimal and observed levels of labour employment).  
TABLE 5. Total of physical job created (unit: job)  
Mode I  820,289  
Mode II  (10,506,332) 
Table (5) (above) shows the total job created under mode I where we don’t consider 
privatization and under mode II where privatization is taken. It is quite interesting that 
privatization leads to more job creations in mode I (820,289 job created) but results in job 
loss in mode II (more than 10.5 million of jobs).  
TABLE 6. Total of physical job created by skills (unit: job)  
 Level of skilled labour 
 Unskilled Low skilled High skilled Technicians 
Mode I  351,723   169,507   240,799   58,261  
Mode II  (8,829,012)  (2,175,856)  398,195   100,341  
To measure the contribution of privatization to poverty reduction, the model keeps track on 
different scenarios of the mobility of labour. Table (6) (above) shows that under mode I, all 
four types of skilled-level of job are created but under mode II, job losses is found in 
unskilled and low skilled labour and at the optimum allocation the economy needs more high 
skilled workers and technicians. This situation of job creation under mode I and II are fully 
compatible with the factor shadow prices (appendix table (A.4)). Under mode I, all four 
labour constrains are not biding, means all four types of labour force (by skilled-level) are in 
excess of supply. That why an attainable level of 0.76 percent of the welfare resulted in job 
creation of all four types of skill as described in table (6). Under mode II, two first labour 
constrains are binding and the last two are not biding, meaning that technicians and high 
skilled workers are in short of supply whereas low skilled and unskilled workers are in 
excess of supply. That’s why, at the optimum allocation, we got the situation of job creation 
under mode II shown in table (6). 
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More over under mode II, total job losses due to shedding of unskilled and low skilled 
workers is greater than total job created due to the needs for additional high skilled workers 
and technicians. This resulted in total job loss of 10,506,332. It could be understood that 
Vietnam’s economy could be restructured to accelerate growth by allocating more of her 
resources into high value added sectors (skill-intensive and capital-intensive sectors) and 
hence has to be shedding jobs in low value added sectors such as agriculture and forestry 
where many of the unskilled used to work in. Data from GSO of Vietnam shows that, from 
67 percent of employment in 1998, share of agriculture in total employment now is only 49 
percent (GSO, 2011). This trend is due to the process of industrialization and urbanization, 
which has been gaining momentum during the last ten years. Table (A.5) of the appendix 
shows that under mode II, the sectors that have been shedding jobs are low value added 
sectors which could come from three groups: agriculture-related sectors, low-tech 
manufacturing sectors and less efficient service sectors. It is quite interesting that job losses 
could be happened also at some high-technology sectors such as electronic, car and motor 
manufacturing. These sectors dominated by foreign owned firms have been long protected 
by the Government’s protection policy. Belonging to highly protected industry, these foreign 
owned firms became low international competitiveness. They are or relying on domestic 
market or doing transfer pricing (Ngoc, 2009). This leads to their low contribution to the 
GDP of the nation and hence could be an explanation for job losses of these sectors. 
The multi-sectorial integrated activity analysis results in optimal level of labour employment 
by skill and by type of ownerships. Hence we could calculate net job-creation by type of skill 
and type of ownership. Table (7) (follows) shows total of physical job created by types of 
ownership under mode II (the breaking down for 69 industries are presented in appendix 
table (A.6)). The parentheses in table (7) represent negative sign.  
TABLE 7. Total of physical job created by type of ownership under mode II 
(unit: thousand of jobs)  
 Type of ownership 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Total  5,181,329   9,100,818   (25,408,441)  (6,513,869)  7,133,831  
Unskilled  (301,721)  4,169,892   (12,598,414)  (4,123,271)  4,024,501  
Low-skilled  900,177   2,803,721   (5,778,727)  (1,785,822)  1,684,795  
High-skilled  3,904,876   1,704,063   (5,485,195)  (747,817)  1,022,268  
Technicians  677,997   423,142   (1,546,105)  143,040   402,267  
Type of ownership: 1: state-central-owned    2: state-local-owned   
3: 100% private-owned  4: 100% foreign-owned.   5: joint-venture  
As shown by table (7), in total, private firms are shedding workers in all four types of labour. 
100% foreign firms are also shedding most types of workers (except technicians). As we 
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could see from table (7), Vietnam economy, at optimum allocation, much labour moves from 
private and 100% foreign owned firm into state sector and joint venture firms. But in fact 
total job losses are still 10,506,332. Even a larger number of job are created by state and join 
venture firms which could helps to absorb the out-of-job workers in private and 100% 
foreign firms, it could not help to offset the huge number of job losses due to shedding 
workers from private firms and 100% foreign firms. Therefore, even making a contribution 
to the better performance of the economy in terms of welfare improvement (as discussed in 
section 5.1), privatization under more flexibility of factor movement does not help to 
accelerate the level of job creation across sectors. This means there is a trade off between 
growth and creating opportunity: if Vietnam wants to growth faster from it current labour 
force structure, it could lead to a result when the economy has to shed a large amount of low 
skilled and unskilled workers. In fact, that kind ownership restructuring does not contribute 
to a higher job creation. 
Where these newly unemployed labour could move? According to GSO of Vietnam, in 2009, 
jobless rate was estimated at 5.1 percent (2.3 percent in urban area and 6.1 percent in rural 
area), which is much higher than the official unemployment rate of 2.9 percent in 2009. 
Since Vietnam has a thriving informal economy where the jobless can take refuge, this led to 
the growth in the size of informal sector worker during this period. Most new entrants within 
the labour market that are unable to find jobs in the formal sectors or laid-off workers will 
not become unemployed, but rather they will end up working in the informal sector (Cling et 
al., 2010). Employment in the shadow economy is quite high in other developing countries, 
such as Brazil and India, which comprises of nearly half of total employment, and nearly 
three-quarters in Indonesia (The Economist, Jun 2010).
3
 
Table (A.7) and (A.8) of the appendix show the level of job creation by 69 industries and by 
skill-level under model I and model II respectively. Table (A.8) of the appendix shows that 
low-tech and medium-tech manufacturing sectors need more skilled workers to achieve the 
attainable level of activity. Whereas in high-tech manufacturing sectors (electronic, radio, 
TV, petroleum and gas) and service sectors (banking, insurance, business and consultancy 
services) need more technicians.  
6. Conclusions 
Throughout more than 20 years of “Doi Moi”, Vietnam economy is still under pressure to 
reduce the size of the state sector. Privatization, during last 20 years of renovation has 
reduced not only number of SOEs but also the labour endowment of this sector. However, 
privatization seems not to weaken SOE economic power as the share of state sector in GDP 
is quite stable and the share of state sector in total investment is still high. 
                                                 
3
 See the  Appendix table 12 for the Vietnam’s size of informal sector. 
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This paper examines how the privatization under ownership restructuring could contribute to 
economic growth and hence accelerate poverty reduction in Vietnam. The analysis shows 
that privatization does contribute to welfare improvement. As privatization is examined at 
the optimal allocation of resources, roles of different types of ownerships could be drawn 
from.  
First, the analysis shows that privatization, as it was happened so far, does not mean to 
weaken the economic power of state sector. At the optimum, the role of state-central-owned 
enterprises slightly weakens but state-local-owned enterprises becomes much more 
important with its attainable contribution to GDP being achieved at 23 percent. Role of the 
private sector and 100% foreign invested firms become weaker at the optimum as their 
attainable contribution to GDP declines sharply. Main driving force of welfare improvement 
is join-venture firms as its attainable share in GDP is 43 percent. This conclusion is a source 
of policy implication for ownership restructuring strategy: 
 The presence of state-owned firms should be continued and particularly enhance the 
role of local-state owned one. In fact as it was analysed in section 5.1 (p.16), shifting 
of resources lines in the difference in factor productivities according to ownership of 
production. Hence, if policy measure could be made to increase the factor 
productivity in the state-owned enterprise, it is not needed to do entirely the 
privatization. However, this would need a comprehensive policy measure as efficient 
management, particularly, in resource management, is an chromic disease of the state 
management in Vietnam. 
 100% foreign invested firms might not be fully encouraged, rather there should be a 
selection of foreign invested license. Recent study by Bui Trinh (2010) shows that 
foreign invested firms contribute to trade deficit of Vietnam as their intermediate 
demands for production are mainly imported goods when most of them have reported 
loss to the tax department. According to Bui Trinh (2010), Duc (2010), and Nghia 
(2010), the main reason of loss-report from foreign invested firms is that they have 
manipulated “transfer pricing skill” which make it hard to be controlled by the tax 
department. However, as it has been widely accepted, the presence of foreign firms 
could lead to positive externalities for local firm, such as enhancing interactive 
learning through technological change or knowledge management; creating an 
competitive pressure on economic environment. In fact, many domestic firms have 
benefited from plugging into the global value chain through backward linkages with 
high-tech manufacturing sectors. Therefore, a oriented foreign investment 
accommodative policy, which focus on backwards linkage through supporting 
industries, is worth to do. 
Second, the analysis also shows that privatization does not contribute to job creation. Further 
analysis on different type of skills shows that at the optimum, demands for high skilled 
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labour : technicians is 4 : 1. This prompts the policy implication for technical and vocational 
training strategy. According to MOLISA (2005), the training recipe between technical 
vocational training – technical high school – college, university level in Vietnam was 2.8 : 
0.9 : 1. This shows that in order to have good labour force availability for economic 
development, Vietnam needs to change her current status of vocational raining to match the 
demands of the national economy, at which the optimum recipe of 4 : 1 is a reference.
4
 
Last, the analysis also shows that at the optimum, more value added don’t associate with 
more job creation in general, as shifting of resources lies in the difference in factor 
productivities, thus leads to the need for more high skilled workers and technicians which are 
scare in Vietnam. As a lesson from ASEAN tigers, advantage of low-cost labour will sooner 
or latter not be an incentive for firms’ investment decisions in labour-intensive sectors, as 
wage rate is continuously increasing. Therefore, if labour quality improvement could not be 
made, the current skill situation of Vietnam’s labour force will be a ‘bottle neck’ for Vietnam 
economic growth in the near future. 
                                                 
4
 The optimum training recipe could be considered for the implementation of some current Government 
Decrees on Vocational Training Strategy for Rural Labour which recently been promulgated such as Decision 
1956/QĐ-TTg on vocational training for rural labour for the period of 2010-2020 (27/11/2009); Decision 
103/2008/QĐ-TTg on 21/7/2008 on supporting youth in vocational training and self-employment creation for 
the period 2008-2015; Decision 295/QĐ-TTg on 26/2/2010 on supporting women in vocational training and job 
creation. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Methodology 
Modeling with sector-specific capital 
If capital are modeled as being sector-specific, constraints for capital stock are as follows: 
(4)   
 
eye(n)* ~ K{ }s £ M  
where: 
 eye(n)
 identity matrix [# of sector by # of sector] 
*~ element-by-element matrix operators (horizontal direct product 
 z = x* ~ y
: the input 
matrices must have the same number of row. The result will have cols(x)*cols(y) 
columns) 
In Mode I, the primal program (1) in which capital stocks are sectoral specific could be 
rewritten as follows: 
(5) 
 
max
s2 ,c2
eT fc2 subject to 
   
 
V T -U( )s2 ³ fc2 + g
Ls2 £ N
eye(n)* ~ K{ }s2 £ M
s2 ³ 0
 
In Mode II, the primal program (3) would be: 
(6) 
 
max
s2 ,c2
eT fc2 subject to 
  
 
V
split
T -U
split( )s2 ³ fc2 + g =: F
L
1
~ L
2
~ L
3
~ L
4
~ L
5( )s
2 £ N
eye(n)* ~ K{ }s2 £ M
s2 ³ 0
 
Modeling for Open Economy Mode 
As Vietnam being an open economy, we could also consider an Open Economy Mode where 
we consider net export is an endogenous variable. However as stated, open economy model 
could leads Vietnam to close in most of its sectors and only few sectors with high level of 
trade volume (net export) will exists. In order to avoid the unexpected solution of total 
dependence on foreign supply, in this mode, we isolate non-tradable goods (those with zero 
net export) and force their activity levels (
 
s
non-tradable
) to be equal to activity level of domestic 
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final demand ( c). We could also test the open economy model under the scenario 3 (capital 
stock are sectoral specific) as a mean that would have avoided full specialization in a 
restricted number of sectors.  
In Open Economy Mode I, the primal program (1) for the open economy, scenario 1 is as 
follows: 
(7)     
 
max
s1 ,c1 ,g1
eT fc1 subject to 
    
 
V T -U( )s1 ³ fc1 + Jg =: F
Ls1 £ N
Ks1 £ M
-eT g £ -eT g t =: D
s3 ³ 0
 
and the dual program is: 
(8) minp,r,w,e³0 rM + wN + eDsubject to 
    
 
p V T -U( ) £ rK + wL
pf = eT f
pJ = e
 
In Open Economy Mode II, the primal program (3) for the open economy, scenario 3 (capital 
stock are sectoral specific) is as follows: 
(9)     
 
max
s2 ,c2 ,g2
eT fc2subject to 
  
 
V
split
T -U
split( )s2 ³ fc2 + Jg =: F
L
1
~ L
2
~ L
3
~ L
4
~ L
5( )s
2 £ N
eye(n)* ~ K{ }s2 £ M
-eT g £ -eT g t =: D
s2 ³ 0
 
g  vector of net export [# of tradable commodities] 
gt  vector of net exports observed at time t [# of tradable] 
J  0-1 matrix placing tradeables [# of commodities by # of tradeables] 
D  observed trade deficit [scalar] 
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and the dual program is: 
(10) minp,r,w,e³0 rM + wN + eDsubject to 
   
 
p V
split
T -U
split( ) £ rK + wL
pf = eT f
pJ = e
 
Remarks: 
1. The sector specific capital scenarios were tested both in mode I and mode II. We have 
only found the solution for mode I and II, when labour is full mobility and capital are 
modeled  as being sector-specific. We then aggregate the number of capital constrains into 
17 aggregated sectors from 69 sectors of the input-output table. The attainable levels of 
welfare under mode I almost close to zero and under mode II is just about 3 percent. The 
factors shadow price are zero in both mode, non of the labour or capital constrains is biding. 
That is why we decided to skip this scenario. 
2. Open economy modeling was tested with mode I and II. However mode II did not work. 
As stated in page 9, we decided to skip this and prefer pursuing the analysis in the contact of 
a closed economy. 
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